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Abstract  
Since 2013, the Chinese government has attempted to make a transition from user-pay PPP to government-pay PPP systems with the aim of facilitating infrastructure investment and government transformation. Whilst the application of government-pay PPP systems can considerably expand the areas where PPPs are suitable, the lengthy procurement time experienced in the implementation of similar systems (e.g., Private Finance Initiative (PFI)) presents a tough challenge to Chinese procuring authorities who are under increasing pressure to get the earmarked PPP projects off the ground swiftly to stem the downward pressure in the economy. The first PFI-ish project in China, the Anqing Urban Road PPP project, has been successfully tendered in May 2015 with an impressive record on procurement time. Through the scrutiny of this project, it is found that speedy procurement is achieved by leaving some of the major risks ill-defined and vaguely allocated in the tender document. However, this apparent high risk exposure did not deter investors. This research maintains that the greater risk tolerance revealed among SOE-led investors should be attributed to the power structure embedded in China’s administrative system. Whilst leveraging this mechanism can reduce transaction costs, it could hold back the participation of private investors in future Chinese PPP projects. 
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Introduction 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) have been employed worldwide as a mechanism to usher 
private capital and expertise into the provision of public services and infrastructure assets (National 
Audit Office, 2015; United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 2008; US Department of 
the Treasury, 2014). Since the time Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) gained momentum as an 
infrastructure delivery system in mid-1980, China had started its experimentation with this system 
to channel foreign direct investment into the construction and operation of Shajiao B power plant 
in Shenzhen city (Sachs et al., 2007). According to the WB/PPAF PPP database, there are 1,269 
(concession and greenfield) projects implemented in China over the period 1990-2014. The 
Chinese PPP market received another boost recently. In the 3rd Plenum of the 18th Chinese 
Communist Party Central Committee in Nov 2013, the Chinese government set out the vision of 
expanding the applications of PPPs in infrastructure investment. A series of ambitious plans and 
measures have been announced since then to promulgate PPPs from top down and as many as 
1,043 projects (1.95 trillion RMB in investment value) identified as potentially suitable for PPP 
models by China’s central planner, National Development and Reform Commission. With huge 
commercial opportunities lying ahead in this fast growing market, there is a need for the global 
PPP community to deepen the understanding of how and why Chinese PPP systems work in 
practice, thereby positioning themselves correctly in the value chain of this market. 
In this wave of PPP investment, the Chinese government has dual goals: in the short term, 
to offload debt from the government account to corporate accounts through PPP arrangements; in 
the long run, to precipitate the transformation of public investment from asset-focused to service-
focused. The former is primarily achieved through the Transfer-Operate-Transfer model, while the 
latter has to rely upon PPP models that enable the government to purchase asset-based services 
from private suppliers (e.g., Private Finance Initiative (PFI)). The current research explores how 
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the Chinese government can overcome barriers in the process of ushering in the first PFI-style PPP 
model in China.  
Generally, PPPs provide a contractual structure to allow the private investor to undertake 
works normally executed by the government using their own capital in hopes of recouping the 
investment via delayed payments that are funded by user charges, government budgets or third 
party revenues. In practice, PPPs have two subsystems: government-pay (e.g., PFI) and user-pay 
(e.g., BOT) (Chang and Chou, 2014; World Bank, 2014). As regulated by different laws in France, 
Brazil and China, two systems exhibit distinct features. Under user-pay systems, the key test for 
project viability is to what extent the capital investment can be covered by the revenue from project 
users while maintaining a non-negative social surplus in cost-benefit analysis. Yet, fully self-
financeable projects are rare in practice. Miscellaneous supporting measures (e.g., minimum 
volume guarantee, direct subsidy and revenue sharing mechanism) are often used by procuring 
authorities to spur market interest (Engel et al., 2014). By contrast, government-pay systems 
emerged as an alternative route for public service provision, so the best justification is grounded 
in efficiency improvement. Of the 700 plus PFI projects, the vast majority were contracted through 
a variant of PFI, known as design-build-finance-operate (DBFO), under which the private 
investor’s return is made dependent upon the availability of project assets and the performance of 
services provided. The robustness of output-based payments is built on two conditions: output 
specifications must be complete enough to cover every aspect of project output and fairly priced 
to provide strong incentives for desired behaviour. Both conditions require intense negotiations 
between parties, making the procurement process particularly lengthy. According to a 
comprehensive review of PFI by HM Treasury (HM Treasury, 2012), “[a]verage PFI procurement 
times, from initial project tender to financial close, have stubbornly remained at around 35 months” 
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(p.38). Given that Chinese procuring authorities were under pressure from the central government 
to get projects off the ground swiftly, this weakness could present a major hindrance to the 
transition from user-pay to government-pay PPP systems. Since the first PFI-style PPP project in 
China, the Anqing Urban Road Project (Anqing project, hereafter), was successfully tendered in 
May 2015, this research takes a positivist’s perspective to explore in what ways the concern of 
lengthy procurement time has been tackled in the project and discuss what that could implicate for 
other Chinese PPP projects.  
It is found that the Anqing project is a hybrid model, possessing the features of both BOT-
style and PFI-style PPP systems. Whereas the investment return is dependent upon the 
performance of project output, the construction work is guided by input-based (rather than output-
based) specifications. Procuring a PPP project in six months is an impressive record, but it also 
begs a question: is it a model that other local governments should imitate? This research maintains 
that the outcome of fast delivery is achieved by leveraging the power structure embedded in 
China’s unique political system, which enables Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) to 
negotiate with procuring authorities on equal footing without contractual protection. The major 
contribution of this research is to reveal how this unique mechanism has facilitated the 
implementation of government-pay PPP projects in China with the effect of reducing ex ante 
transaction costs. This research represents an effort to expand the construction holdup literature 
(Chang, 2013a; Chang, 2012; Chang and Ive, 2007a, b; Chang and Qian, 2015b; Ive and Chang, 
2007) to include the effect of business environment, which can eventually lead to building an 
integrated understanding of construction procurement design from the perspective of bargaining 
power.   
Literature Review  
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The nature of this research concerns the study of mechanisms by which PPPs can be driven 
to function. Within  literature, there are three generic mechanisms for inter-organisational 
coordination: legal enforcement, reputations, and relationships (MacLeod, 2007).  
First, in economic analysis, the “default model” of contracting behaviour is Principal-
Agent theory, where the order of a contracting process is maintained by two conditions (Laffont 
and Martimort, 2001): incentive alignment (i.e., making parties feel it desirable to choose the 
action that maximizes the joint output of parties) and enforceability of contractual terms by a third 
party (i.e., disputes resolved cost-effectively by a party with legal enforcement power [e.g., 
arbitrator, court] in accordance with the agreed-upon terms). As encapsulated in Engel et al. (2014), 
PPP research working in this paradigm has made a significant advancement. Engel et al. (2001) 
develops a new contracting method to allow the concession duration to vary with the project 
revenue, while Iossa and Martimort (2012) formally prove that the benefits of service bundling 
can make the DBFO model outperform conventional procurement in efficiency terms. On the 
empirical front, sophisticated econometric models have been employed to explain why 
renegotiations have frequently occurred (Guasch, 2004; Guasch et al., 2008). The logic of the 
Principal-Agent theory (Laffont and Martimort, 2001) or more broadly contract theory (Bolton 
and Dewatripont, 2005) dominates the analysis. Under this framework, the central mechanism lies 
in the use of incentive-compatible contracts that emphasize “sharp in by clear agreement and sharp 
out by clear performance” (p.738) (Macneil, 1974). There are two inter-related issues at hand: 
1) The contract may be strategically designed to be incomplete. In organisational economics 
(Gibbons and Roberts, 2013), an essential distinction is made between complete and incomplete 
contracting. A construction contract is said to be incomplete if some contingencies are not well 
stipulated in contract clauses (Chang and Ive, 2002). Theoretically, the owner has to trade off the 
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degree of contractual incompleteness against the frequency and severity of change orders and the 
attendant transaction costs (Bajari and Tadelis, 2001; Chang and Qian, 2015a).  
2) Empirical evidence reveals that there is high variation in the enforcement cost of contracts 
across countries (Djankov et al., 2003), so contracts are not always the most effective choice for 
the governing of transactions. The contract enforcement gap arising from both causes will create 
room for non-legal enforcement mechanisms.  
Apart from legal reliefs, traders can fall back on reputations or relationships in enforcing 
contractual obligations (MacLeod, 2007). In Axelrod’s term, both reputations or relationships can 
“enlarge the shadow of the future” (p.126) (Axelrod, 2006), making cooperation become a 
dominant strategy for traders. Incorporating the future return or penalty into the current decision 
can, on the one hand, increase the range of random shocks under which the contract can enforce 
itself (known as “self-enforcing range) (Klein and Leffler, 1981) and, on the other, reduce the 
likelihood of occurring opportunistic exploitation of one’s vulnerability (Klein, 1996). Actually, 
there has been evidence that the enforcement of PPP contracts may resort to informal control 
mechanisms (Caldwell et al., 2009; Parker and Hartley, 2003; Zheng et al., 2008), which are 
characterized by open communication, information sharing, trust, and cooperation (Poppo and 
Zenger, 2002). These two mechanisms work complimentarily with legal enforcement in most 
commercial transactions and also in PPP transactions. If used properly, formal and informal 
mechanisms can buttress each other (North, 1990). The choice of PPP governance is sensitive to 
institutional environments (Cunha Marques and Berg, 2011; Essig and Batran, 2005). China’s 
unique public administration system should have a fundamental impact on the way Chinese PPP 
systems are run.  
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Before 2013, China had only user-pay PPP systems, officially known as concession 
systems. Of the fourteen variants implemented so far (Adams et al., 2006), BOT is the most 
common form. To distinguish the new arrival of government-pay PPP systems from the preexisting 
concession systems, PPP is a term reserved for the former in China. However, to harmonize with 
the international terminology, PPP refers to both systems in the current research. In the thirty-year 
history of implementation, PPP investment in China comes in three waves with SOEs playing an 
increasingly pivotal role (Mu et al., 2011). A weak legal system has been identified as the key 
inhibitor to construction in general (Sha, 2004) and PPP development in particular (Chan et al., 
2010; Chen and Doloi, 2008). Low trust in the enforcement of legal obligations in China could 
either scupper PPPs as a viable procurement system or precipitate the development of alternative 
enforcement mechanisms. On account of the prevalent use of PPPs in China in recent decades, 
there must be a mechanism sustaining its working in China. As reported in the literature, PPP 
procurement is fraught with opportunistic behaviour, which could originate from the investor side 
(Chang, 2013a; Chang and Ive, 2007a; Cruz and Marques, 2013; Lonsdale, 2005; Ubbels and 
Verhoef, 2008) or the government side (Guasch and Straub, 2009). In China, the government is in 
a dominant position, so post-contract exploitation from the government could present a real 
concern to investors. Under this environment, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have a competitive 
edge relative to private investors (Lu et al., 2013): first, from the perspective of procuring 
authorities, commissioning PPP projects to SOEs can lower the risk of being charged with 
privatizing state assets, as it could be deemed politically wrong by the staunch Leftist; second, 
SOEs have adequate financial and physical resources to undertake the work. This is why “social 
capital”, instead of “private capital”, is used to reflect the active role of SOEs in the current Chinese 
PPP market. Different from prior attempts to understand the evolution of PPP environment at the 
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institutional level (Matos‐Castaño et al., 2014; Zhang et al., 2015), the current research is 
concerned with the micro-analytical issues, where the context-specific nature of power relations 
should be properly addressed (Chen and Hubbard, 2012). Whereas power provides a useful 
analytical lens, it could become tautology if the source of power is not specified (Williamson, 
1995). In the literature of construction holdup problems (Chang, 2013a; Chang, 2012; Chang and 
Ive, 2007a, b; Chang and Qian, 2015b; Ive and Chang, 2007), the concept of bargaining power is 
operationalized in terms of quasi rent (the return in excess of the minimum required by the trader 
to continue with the transaction (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992)).  
In transaction cost economics, one of the most influential approaches to organisational 
analysis, bargaining power balance occupies the central ground in explaining the root cause of 
transaction costs that matter in comparing alternative governance structures (Chang and Ive, 2000; 
Williamson, 1996). Efficiency can be assured by resorting to market competition if switching to 
an alternative supplier incurs little loss during the contracting process. However, the difficulty of 
switching increases as the amount of specific investment is locked into the transaction. Quasi rent 
is a general measure for one party’s incentives to complete the transaction (Klein et al., 1978). The 
differential in quasi rents of two parties is a decisive factor for bargaining power in post-contract 
negotiations (Chang, 2013a; Chang, 2012; Chang and Qian, 2015b). In general terms, the 
construction owner has to face increasing bargaining disadvantage as the construction work 
progresses on site (Chang and Ive, 2007b). Given the incompleteness of the contract, uncertainty 
could upset the original transaction (Chang and Ive, 2002). The prevalence of change orders is a 
case in point (Alnuaimi et al., 2009; Hsieh et al., 2004; Ibbs, 2005). 
The cost of switching to an alternative supplier can serve as a good measure of quasi rent 
in the construction context (Chang and Ive, 2007b). This cost is also identified as a major 
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contributor to holdup problems in western PPP procurement (Ball and King, 2006; Lonsdale, 2005). 
The greater the loss incurred in changing the trading partner, the less bargaining power one has in 
negotiating with the partner. Nevertheless, owing to the dominance of the Chinese government 
over other parties, this reasoning may not have a good predictive power in the Chinese PPP context. 
Inspired by the practice in the Anqing project, the current study attempts to enrich this line of 
inquiry by analyzing the role of external power structure in balancing out the appropriability 
hazards from the government side and linking this benefit to shorter procurement time achieved in 
the project.  
 
The Method 
Case study is chosen as the research method because the issues of interest in this research satisfy 
Yin’s three conditions (p.2) (Yin, 2013): (1) the central question is a why question, i.e., why has 
the Anqing project  been procured faster than similar government-pay projects in western 
countries?; (2) the investigator has no control over the way the project was procured; (3) the focus 
is a contemporary phenomenon, i.e., the first PFI-ish project in China just tendered in May 2015. 
Apart from the aforementioned research question, there are four other elements in the research 
design (p.27): (1) this research has two propositions: the shorter procurement time was achieved 
at the expense of contractual completeness and, given the fact of the tender being successful, the 
uncertainty arising from contractual incompleteness was not deemed excessive because the 
investors did not feel vulnerable in negotiations, should the uncertainty materialize. (2) this 
research takes the Anqing project as the unit of analysis with the aim of exploring what mechanism 
has made it work; (3) the logic linking the data to the propositions runs as follows: through the 
scrutiny of tender documents and comparison with standard PFI contracts, it is expected to find 
that the allocation of some significant risks was left ill-defined at tender in order to save 
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procurement time, but that does not deter some investors as a result of their strong bargaining 
position in the face of the procuring authority, which can possibly be shown by examining the 
socio-political resources of these investors; (4) the criteria used in judging the quality of arguments 
are through the comparison of alternative explanations in terms of logical plausibility, thereby 
making suggestions for further studies. 
 
The Case Study: Anqing Urban Road PPP project 
Project background  
Anqing is a municipal city in the southwest of Anhui Province. To upgrade a main traffic artery 
of the city to urban A-grade road, the city government decided to utilize private expertise and 
capital to expedite the progress of the project. The road starts from the city airport and crosses the 
city from north-west to south-east with a total length of 14.93 kilometers, 29% of which are bridges 
and tunnels. Prior to choosing the PPP route, the government completed the engineering design of 
the project, so both drawings/specifications and bills of quantities are available to potential bidders 
at tender. The prospective investor is responsible for the financing, construction and operation of 
the project. The key information and transaction structure of the project is exhibited in Table 1 and 
Figure 1.  
In 2014, the Anqing project was earmarked by the Ministry of Finance as one of the pilot projects 
for trialing a government-pay PPP system in China. In principle, the decision on the choice of 
government-pay PPP system should be justified by a practical test, known as the value for money 
(VfM) assessment (HM Treasury, 2006) in which the new private finance model is compared 
against the conventional procurement to see if there is a cost savings. In comparing relative 
efficiency, a critical factor that could tip the balance from one route to the other is the cost of risk 
transfer. As one of the most complicated procurement systems, PPP projects are susceptible to a 
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wide variety of risk impacts (Ke et al., 2010; Tiong, 1990). The risk premiums required by the 
investor are a decisive factor for the relative desirability of PPPs. As the Anqing project was a pilot 
project, value for money was not a primary concern. The key issue was how the government can 
secure investment speedily while minimizing road service charges. The government introduced a 
competitive tendering process to reduce the payments to the winning investor. Squeezing the 
investor’s profit margin can achieve better value for money, but it also constrained the room for 
shortening procurement time. In an output-based procurement, time is mainly spent negotiating 
output specifications, related risks and their prices, so speedier procurement is only possible by 
leaving some of the requirements and risks vaguely defined when tendering the project. Certainly, 
this comes at a cost: the investor will demand a higher compensation for the uncertainty, which 
might totally undermine the project’s viability. In the presentation of the case, this research first 
elaborates on the competitive mechanism used and secondly investigates the soundness of risk 
allocation to set the stage for the analysis of procurement time.  
 
How to maintain competition pressure?  
To understand how competition works in the Anqing project, it is useful to introduce a 
mathematical model to illustrate the crucial linkage between risks, pricing, and payments. The 
rules of the tender consist of four parts (see Figure 2): (1) the estimated construction costs and 
relocation cost are provided in the tender document, which are 1.526 billion RMB and 0.45 billion 
RMB respectively; (2) the total (non-discounted) availability payment (TAP) should not exceed 4 
billion RMB; (3) the percentage of annual availability payment to total availability payment (dt, 
t=3,…,13) should not exceed 15% a year in the first six years and 10% in year 7 to 13; (4) annual 
performance payment for operating and maintaining the road (PPt, t=3,…,13) must not exceed 10 
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million RMB. Under these rules, the bidder’s revenue-related decision variables can be denoted 
by a row matrix   .133,,  tPPTAP, d ttRD  
In bidding for this project, the investor k has several factors to consider. First, part of the total 
capital investment involves the cost of relocating residents from the construction site, which is 
capped by a fixed payment of 540 million RMB to the government. Second, according to the bills 
of quantities provided by the government, the construction cost (CC) is likely to center around 
1.526 billion RMB, which is incurred in year one and year two separately (CCt, t=1,2) and subject 
to a random risk tc ,ξ  with mean tc,  and variance tc, , i.e.,  
   21 ,21 ,, 526.1)( t tct tctcCCCC                                    (1) 
Third, the operating cost (OC) can be expressed in a similar way, i.e.,  
  133 ,, )(t totoOCOC                                                   (2) 
where toOC ,  and to ,  indicate the operating cost in year t and the random shock that could impact 
upon it. For the investment consortium k, after choosing annual availability payments (APt) and 
annual performance payments (PPt), the expected net present value of the project cash flows 
E[NPVk] becomes  
     133 ,,21 ,, )1( )()1( )(54.0][ t t totoktttt t tctcktk r RPOCPPAPr RPCCNPVE       (3) 
where RPc,t and RPo,t represent the extra prices (i.e., risk premiums) which the investment 
consortium k could charge for bearing the risks tc ,ξ  and to , .    
In the tender document, the government has already laid down the rule that the winning 
social capital investor must form a joint venture company with the government’s own investment 
company (named “Anqing city investment company”) with an equity contribution ratio of 88% 
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(investor) to 12% (government). Under this capital structure, the social capital investor can make 
a profit from his investment in the consortium company and from the contracting service to the 
project company. Generally, the consortium offloads the entire risks ( tc ,ξ  and to , ) through back-
to-back contracts with social capital contractors to perform the construction and operating works 
(Chang, 2013b). What the contractor may require for return (πks) is proportional to the standard 
deviations of the risks (Chang, 2013a; Chang, 2014; Gibbons, 2005):  



   21 133
2,22,2 )1()1(2
1
t t t
too
t
tccksks r
b
r
b                                          (4) 
where ks  represents the social capital investor ks’s Arrow-Pratt coefficient of risk aversion. The 
superscript ks is to indicate that the social capital investor is just a leading member of the 
investment consortium k. For the investor ks, the profit function is therefore 
kskskks NPVENPVE   ][88.0][                                          (5) 
In the bidding, the social capital investor ks has to make two decisions on behalf of the 
consortium k that is not formed until he wins: one is related to the revenue required from the 
government RD  and the other is associated with the risk premiums required by the consortium, 
denoted by a row matrix   131,, ,,  tRPRP totcCD .  
The contract is placed through a competitive process, so the investor ks has to trade off 
profit margin against winning probability in considering the decision variables RD  and CD . 
Suppose there are n bidders participating in the competition. For ease of notation, the setting of 
symmetric common-knowledge auction game is followed (Krishna, 2009), namely that all bidders 
have (1) the same information set and (2) the similar construction capability, reflected in the same 
cumulative probability distribution of bidding prices, G. The bidder ks selects a price kNPV  on 
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behalf of the consortium k and he wins if jk NPVNPV   kj  , which corresponds to the 
probability of winning   1)(1  nkNPVG . To simplify, it is assumed that the agency problem is not 
present, namely that the investor ks pursues the maximization of the consortium k’s profit while 
considering the likelihood of winning the tender:  
  
133   000,000,10 (4)        
137    %10/ (3)        
61    %15/ (2)        
000,000,000,4 (1)    s.t.
)(1 max
13
3 t
1
,










tPP
tTAPAP
tTAPAP
APTAP
NPVGNPVE
t
t
t
t
nkk
CR DD
                                    (6) 
where all bidders are required to discount cash flows at the same rate of 8%. Despite no analytical 
solution, Eq.(6) can still unveil how competition works in this project for attaining better value for 
money: Whilst it is the investor’s interest to set a higher kNPV  to increase profit, its benefit could 
be offset by a lower winning probability ( )))(1()(  kkk NPVGNPVGNPV . As a result, 
auctioning off the project competitively can help the government achieve greater efficiency. 
However, competitive tendering does not guarantee that the project is able to secure an investor. 
Actually, PPP procurement is awash with tender failure (Chang and Ko, 2015) and renegotiation 
problems (Guasch et al., 2006; Guasch et al., 2008). Given a fixed cost envelope, the tender could 
fail if the risk allocation scheme proposed by the government is perceived to be too risky (i.e., both 
tc,  and to,  in large variations). This is the issue to be addressed next.  
Soundness of risk allocation 
As emphasized in the mathematical model discussed previously, the degree of contractual 
completeness holds the key to understanding why the Anqing project can succeed in securing 
investment. Since HM Treasury has been working closely with China’s Ministry of Finance for 
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three years (2012-2015) in the development of a strategy for introducing government-pay PPP 
projects in China, a judgment can be drawn by comparing Anqing’s risk allocation arrangement 
with the practices recommended in the standardized PFI contract (HM Treasury, 2007). The 
analysis takes two steps: first, checks if significant risks are properly allocated; and second, if price 
adjustment mechanisms can provide an effective remedy for inappropriate risk allocation in the 
post-contract stage.  
When it comes to risk allocation strategy, the Anqing project differs from the standard PFI 
project in one important aspect: the Anqing project’s requirements are set out in the form of 
drawings and specifications and thus it represents an input-based rather than output-based 
procurement. Unlike the PFI under which the project is delivered to meet design parameters and 
output specifications, Anqing bidders can only respond to a given risk allocation scheme pre-
determined by the government by varying the prices charged. Input-based procurement together 
with fixed risk allocation lead to a considerable shortening of procurement time (6 months) 
compared to the PFI average of 35 months (HM Treasury, 2012). Even after considering the fact 
that the detailed design is completed prior to tender, this record is still impressive. Yet, speediness 
normally comes hand at the expense of contractual completeness. As discussed in the research 
methods section, the evidence of contract completeness can serve as the first logical linkage in the 
case study.  
First, the most significant risk in the project is the time and cost needed for relocating 
existing residents from the project site. This risk rarely appears in the normal PFI project, but could 
fundamentally change the viability of the project. Whilst the government caps the investor’s direct 
exposure to 450 million RMB, there is a residual risk: the delay in relocation may spill over onto 
the completion time of construction and thus the timing of receiving availability payments. In 
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recent years, even in China, relocating residents has been increasingly difficult. There is no reason 
to be optimistic about the possible impact of this risk in the Anqing project. According to the 
project agreement, should this risk eventuate, the investor can receive a fraction of availability 
payment in proportion to the ratio of the value of work completed at the end of the 25th month (one 
month after the expected completion time (24 months)) to the total investment value (i.e., 1.9625 
billion RMB). In current Chinese banking practice, the loan covenant contains flexibility to allow 
repayments to be made according to the money actually drawn down, so the project company is 
unlikely to run into cash flow problems because of this risk. Yet, the delayed receipt of payments 
will hit the shareholder’s rate of return and thus the investability of the project. 
Second, operating performance strongly depends upon the way the road is used, such as 
traffic volume and loadings of vehicles. The building of the new road in this project is expected to 
significantly simulate the local economy and thus to attract higher volumes of car traffic. This risk 
is not addressed in the tender document. 
Third and utmost risk source lies in the occurrence of road excavation requested by other 
bodies for good cause and the liability of its impact on operating performance. The project 
agreement contains a provision on this risk: The government retains the right to authorize road 
excavation for the maintenance and repairs of underground pipelines passing through the project 
site and the project company must do his best to support the work. If negatively affected, the 
company’s operating performance should be assessed by taking into account the impact of 
excavation work. Under this general term, how the impact of this risk could be shared between 
parties seems up in the air in the bidding stage.  
Whilst contracting in these terms will expose the investors to considerable risks, the impact 
would be mitigated if payments can be fairly adjusted post contract. Over the long contract life, 
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variations may occur, so it is critical to ensure that value for money can be maintained in the 
pricing of variations during the operational phase (National Audit Office, 2008). In the PFI, small-
value changes are normally priced according to an index-linked price catalogue annexed to the 
contract. However, large-value changes could be priced through a more sophisticated process (e.g., 
competitive tendering if the work involves low interface problems with the existing operator) or 
using various techniques, including value testing, market testing and benchmarking, with the 
assistance of technical advisors. In the Anqing case, government-initiated and investor-initiated 
changes are treated differently. If the changes are required by the government, the availability 
payment ( newTAP ) is adjusted according to the ratio of new total capital investment (CCnew) to old 
estimate (CCold) (i.e., 1.976 billion RMB).  
976.1 newnew
CCTAPTAP                                                       (7) 
However, if the change request is put forward by the investor for a justifiable reason (e.g., 
optimization of the construction process), the adjustment can be made by reference to  
oldnewnewoldnew
oldnewnew CCCCCCCCTAPTAP
CCCCTAPTAP


 if      0.7)(
 if                                                                   (8) 
In other words, the investor is accountable for all cost overruns, but can share 70% of cost savings 
yielded from innovation. These mechanisms are mainly designed for variations and can provide 
little safeguard against unexpected losses arising from the risks of resident reallocation, traffic 
conditions and road excavation. What is more, unlike most PFI transactions where availability and 
performance payments are linked to a price index series that can best reflect the changes of relevant 
cost items in the market, only operating costs are indexed in the Anqing case, and thus the investor 
is exposed to interest rate risk in servicing the debt.  
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Given the aforementioned contract design and a vague risk allocation scheme, this project 
can still attract four serious bidders and successfully secure investment, which indicates that the 
price for taking these risks lies within the cost envelope of the government (the constraints in 
Eq.(6)). An intriguing question is: why has the project not been held back by the ill-defined risk 
allocation?  
 
Explanation: external power balance structure 
The procurement strategy of the Anqing project indicates that the transitional model 
emerges as an arrangement of convenience under the influence of the procuring authority’s 
strategic goal and constraints. The Anqing project is among the first wave of pilot PPP projects in 
China, so the Anqing city government is under pressure to bid out the project speedily. Time 
pressure proves to be a decisive factor in the design of procurement mechanism. Procurement time 
can be shortened in the Anqing project owing to two reasons: First, completion of technical design 
makes it possible to tender the project on the basis of a complete technical design and bills of 
quantities so the project scope does not require negotiation. Second, there is no risk register 
provided and no negotiation allowed for risk allocation during the procurement process.  
Compared to Government-pay PPP systems in western countries (see Figure 3(a)), the 
Anqing case has a different price formation mechanism (see Figure 3(b)). A PFI project is normally 
initiated in response to a set of high-level strategic goals, which guides the formulation of design 
and requirements. PFI procurement is time-consuming as the procuring authority needs to 
negotiate with the preferred bidder through a competitive dialogue whereby all risk sources can be 
clearly defined and allocated, and the price negotiated. Value for money should be recurrently 
checked during the process. If not, the loop should go one step backward to reconsider the 
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allocation of risks. In the meantime, if the outcome of negotiations makes the project unaffordable, 
there is a need to go two steps back to review the project scope, output specifications and service 
standards required, so as to cut back the project cost to satisfy budget. The iteration of the pricing 
loop in the competitive dialogue can pay off if the well thought-out payment mechanism becomes 
enforceable in the end.  
Evidently, this is not the case in the Anqing project. With the risks combined, the bidders 
can only price the project at low precision, thus exposing themselves to greater hidden risks. Since 
the government retains discretion over how to compensate for the impact of relocation risk, traffic 
condition risk and road excavation risk on the payments, who bears the consequence of the worst 
scenario is out of the investor’s control. The four bidding consortiums are all experienced in similar 
projects, and as such these risks should have been foreseen in the preparation of bids. Based on 
information obtained directly from the cost estimators of two bidders (including the winning bidder) 
in the Anqing project, there seems to be an agreement that the base cost estimate falls in the region 
of 3.5 billion RMB, so the upper limit of total payment, 4 billion RMB, is basically reflective of a 
markup of around 15%. Yet, what the winning bidder actually charges is close to the base cost of 
3.5 billion RMB. This bidding behaviour supplies direct evidence that the vaguely-defined risk 
allocation is largely discounted. By western PFI practices, the risks discussed so far could have 
put off the investors from bidding as too high a risk premium could be added onto the bidding 
price. An intriguing question is how to square up the apparent high uncertainty with the fact that 
the project can still attract sufficient competition. This research contends that the power structure 
of the Chinese society holds the key.  
In western business environments where economic logic dominates, it is the construction 
owner who is vulnerable to appropriability hazards in Oxley’s term (Oxley, 1997). However, this 
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reasoning may not work in the Chinese PPP environment. As opposed to western governments 
which are overseen by elected parliaments, independent judicial systems and media, governments 
in China command supreme authority particularly in the economic arena. This peculiar system 
consigns economic bargaining power to the party with political power. In China’s unique public 
administration system, power is generated by the place of the organisation in the ranking system, 
which is made up of a hierarchy of six levels, including section (ke), division (chu), bureau (jei), 
province (shen)/minister (bou) and state (guo). This system is not only applied to all levels of 
government, but virtually to all non-private bodies, including state-owned enterprises, universities, 
parliaments, associations, judicial institutions, and commissions. The head of the organisation 
holds a corresponding position in the Chinese Communist Party, in which political and thus 
economic power resides. Owing to this system, non-private Chinese organizations become 
comparable and the relative position in the rank serve as an indicator of power in inter-
organizational negotiations. In the Anqing case, three of the four bidders are led by state-owned 
enterprises and the winner, Beijing Urban Construction Design & Development Group Co, is a 
subsidiary company of Beijing Urban Construction Investment & Development Co (BUCID), 
which is a publicly listed corporation but still under the direct control of Beijing city government. 
In PPP projects procured by Beijing city government, BUCID may assume the role of shareholder 
to project companies on behalf of the city government, while in PPP projects commissioned by 
other local governments, BUCID can play the role of social capital investor. In the ranking system, 
BUCID is equivalent to the Anqing city government and that puts both parties on equal footing in 
resolving disputes, which in turn can help them settle disagreements in mutually agreeable terms. 
For this reason, when it comes to the allocation of risk impacts under the Anqing government’s 
discretion, BUCID is at no disadvantage in securing a fair deal. The implicit power structured 
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embedded in the administrative ranking system gives SOEs a unique strength in undertaking the 
risks that are not explicitly allocated in PPP contracts. The existence of this power structure could 
create an unintended benefit for Chinese PPP procuring authorities: with no need to nail down risk 
allocation to every detail prior to tender, procurement time can be considerably shortened. The 
underlying mechanism can be understood in light of the Coase theorem (Coase, 1960). In the world 
of Coasian bargaining, there is no need to spend resources settling the property right allocation ex 
ante as the optimal allocation of surplus can naturally come out ex post through frictionless 
bargaining. The efficiency (in terms of transaction costs) can be maintained because traders can 
call upon a no-cost bargaining mechanism to resolve disputes whenever needed. The availability 
of this (hypothetical) mechanism in a dynamic fashion is the fundamental reason why the Coase 
theorem could work. This research maintains that the “callable” mechanism embedded in China’s 
power structure can serve the similar role of frictionless bargaining in reducing transaction costs 
in PPP procurement. With no fear of being exploited by the procuring authority, the SOE-led 
consortiums are more comfortable to sign into a contract with large room for negotiations in the 
enforcement stage. In the Anqing project, this mechanism is more significant than legal 
enforcement and relationships in enforcing the contract (see Fig.3(b)). 
 
Alternative explanations and limitations 
As explained in the research methods section, the criteria used in interpreting findings compares 
the plausibility of alternative explanations. Aside from the explanation of power structure, on a 
priori ground, there could be two alternative propositions: first, as in conventional procurement, 
opportunistic bidding could occur when the bidders try to secure work at an abnormal low price 
and seek compensation through renegotiations; second, the bidders exhibited no fear because 
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expropriation hazards from the government can be stemmed via bribery. The former seems more 
likely to be the case than the latter given the ongoing anti-graft campaign in China. Whilst this 
research is not able to test the plausibility of two competing explanations (power balancing 
mechanism v.s. opportunistic bidding) directly, there is some strong reason to believe that the 
explanation set out in this research is a more promising line of argument. Over the past two decades, 
user-pay PPP systems have been heavily employed in China. This market is characterized by two 
striking features: dominance of SOEs as investor and relative simplicity of the contract. In the 
extreme case, the contract of a multi-million RMB PPP project may only contain a couple of pages. 
There must be a fundamental force behind the prevalence of these peculiar practices. This research 
maintains that the key to reconciling the apparent incongruence between the complexity of PPP 
procurement and the simplicity of contractual arrangements lies in the exogenous power structure 
in China.  
 
Implications  
The Anqing project represents the first step China has taken to transform its PPP system from user-
pay PPP to government-pay PPP model. Speedy procurement has been prioritized by the central 
government as utmost important. Owing to this project, the Anqing city government can obtain 
the finance of 450 million RMB to clear up the project site, which otherwise would come out of 
its own fiscal budget. The investment of 1.926 billion RMB into this project can provide a direct 
boost to economic growth with a price within the budget envelope, with all this achieved in a 
relatively short time. By these criteria, the Anqing project is successful. But, in terms of 
procurement design, there are several deficiencies: first, input-based procurement considerably 
limits the room of innovation; second, tendering the project with a fixed risk allocation scheme 
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reduces the possibility of achieving higher risk-bearing efficiency; third, leaving too much 
discretion over the liabilities of risk impacts in the government hand could create a disadvantage 
to private and foreign investors owing to the fear of appropriability hazards. Weighing up the pros 
and cons, this research argues that the Anqing model proves to be a workable solution that allows 
the Chinese government, central and local alike, to implement infrastructure projects swiftly via 
PPPs. Compared to the opaque transactions conducted through “local government financing 
platforms” (Lu and Sun, 2013), transacting through PPPs can make local governments more 
accountable for the investment decisions they make, which could curtail the leeway for corruption.  
The Chinese central government looks set to keep pressing for fast delivery in the short run 
to meet its macroeconomic targets. For this reason, in spite of the deficiencies in its contract design, 
the Anqing model could be an imitable model for other local governments who endeavor to tap 
into PPP models to deliver their pipeline investment plans without laboring through the lengthy 
negotiation process (which is 3-5 times longer in PFI). As discussed before, this model relies on 
an implicit power balancing mechanism between SOEs and local governments, so only SOEs are 
well placed to handle the potential hazards. Sticking to the Anqing model can perhaps speed up 
the implementation of investment, but it will militate against the effectiveness of PPPs in 
facilitating China’s transformation from an investment-focused to a service-focused government.  
 
Conclusions 
Since 2013, the Chinese government has strived to set in motion the transformation of Chinese 
economy into “a new normal”, which signals an attempt to shift the focus of macroeconomic 
management target from quantity (e.g., GDP growth rate) to quality (e.g., sustainability or living 
standards). Against this backdrop, PPPs are embraced for dual purposes: in the short run, offload 
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debt from government balance sheet to corporate balance sheet in order to increase transparency 
and fiscal sustainability; in the long run, drive forward the transformation of government to be 
more service oriented. The Anqing project is regarded as the first PFI-ish project in China because 
the investor’s return is explicitly tied to construction and operating performance. Compared to PFI 
projects, a distinguishing feature of this project is the much shorter procurement time, which is 
achieved by not permitting negotiation over risk allocation in the tendering process and leaving 
the allocation of some significant risks to the government’s discretion. By western standards, 
vague contract design could lead to a failure in securing investment owing to the excessive risk 
premium required for accepting the uncertainty. However, the project turns out to the contrary: it 
can still attract serious competition. This research contends that a plausible explanation resides in 
the power structure shaped by China’s administrative system, which enables SOEs to bargain with 
local governments on the equal footing, which in turn can mitigate the severity of appropriability 
hazards from the government. Whilst, from the perspective of procuring authorities, utilising this 
power balancing mechanism can reduce transaction costs, it could hold back the development of 
Chinese government-pay PPP systems in the long run.  
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Figure 1 Transaction Structure of the Anqing Project 
 
 
  
Anqing City Government Authorize 
Anqing Construction Commission 
Authorize as government signatory 
Project Co. 
Political support 
PPP agreement 
Social capital investor handover at contract expiry 
12% capital 88% capital, general contractor 
Anqing Bureau of Finance Budget for performance payment 
repayment Disclosure of project performance debt Public monitoring Services  
General public 
Anqing City Investment Co. 
Financial Institutions 
Chang, C. and Chen, S. (2016). "Transitional Public–Private Partnership Model in China: Contracting with Little Recourse to Contracts." Journal of Construction Engineering and Management,  10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0001166 , 05016011. 
30  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                  Figure 2 Contract Design of the Anqing Project 
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Figure 3 Price formation in PFI and in the Anqing project 
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Table 1 Key Information Sheet for Anqing PPP Project 
Road standard parameters Design speed: 60km/h; design axial loading: BZZ-100; loading grade: Urban-A grade 
Length 14.93 kilometers in total; 4.33 kilometers of tunnels and bridges 
Estimated cost  Relocation cost: 0.45 billion Construction cost: 1.526 billion 
Project scope road engineering, bridge engineering, interchange engineering, pipe line engineering, transportation engineering, lighting engineering, landscaping engineering and other ancillary engineering work  
Scope of operations Maintenance and repair of road and sewerage system; maintenance and repair of public green land and road lighting; cleaning and other maintenance work related to the project or requested by the related government authorities 
Qualifications of the bidder  1. Existing legal enterprise  2. Good credit rating with an audited net asset value of no less than 500 million RMB  3. Registered company capitalization of no less than 350 million RMB 4. Track record of having completed at least one civil road project within the recent five years.  5. With the qualification of Grade I contractor in the class of civil engineering 6. Joint bid permitted with no more than two constituent companies participating; each company contributing at least 40% of the capital required 7. Any individual constituent company allowed to have no more than two affiliated companies to participate  8. Any individual constituent companies pledging not to join other bidding consortium 
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Table 2 The Benefit and Limitation of the Procurement Strategy in the Anqing case 
Benefits (compared to conventional procurement) Limitations 
Financing  Lack of room for innovation 
The investor funds the relocation cost of 450 million RMB which should have come out of the fiscal budget. 
Input-based procurement leaves the investor little room for innovation.  
Growth stimulation Suboptimal risk allocation 
A 1.926 billion RMB investment is made to the economy rather swiftly. Without a constructive competitive dialogue, the government could miss the opportunity of improving risk allocation. 
Transparency of government debt Vaguely-defined risk allocation 
The long-term financial commitment is approved by the local government, so the transparency of government liability can be much improved.  
In the face of this risk, private investors have a higher risk-bearing cost, so it might impede the participation of private and foreign investors.  
Cost saving (?)  
Whilst the price the government pays is within the cost envelope estimated in the same way as in conventional procurement, it is not clear whether PPP has achieved a cost saving 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
